

Liberty

NOT THE DAUGHTER BUT THE MOTHER OF ORDER. PROUDHON

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Whole No. 328.

"For always in thine eyes, O Liberty!
Shines that high light whereby the world is saved;
And though thou slay us, we will trust in thee."

JOHN HAY.

On Picket Duty.

"Anarchy or Government?" is the title of a new book written by William M. Salter and published by T. Y. Crowell & Co. Mr. Salter is a fair and catholic writer, an intelligent critic, and a man who tries to understand the position of his opponents. His book is worth reading. It will be reviewed in Liberty with care and fulness by Mr. Yarros.

Comrade Gordak, of North Scituate, Mass., in writing for some sample copies of Liberty for distribution, says: "The paper improves every year, and I am trying to interest a number of my friends in it. As times grow harder (as they surely will), more men than ever will begin to look around to see what is the matter. The old excuses will not satisfy all men forever. *Not one-twentieth of the voters in the part of the town where I live went to the polls this fall.* That must mean something." It speaks well for the influence of the author of "The Ballot" that nineteen-twentieths of his immediate neighbors have given up voting.

"Justice," the organ of the English Social Democratic Federation, assumes an attitude towards the Lanchester case which, though strange at first sight, is really quite consistent with the fundamental principles of State Socialism. While agreeing in the abstract with Miss Lanchester's view of marriage, "Justice" regrets her action, and deprecates all individual Anarchistic revolt against any present social institution. Here are its delicious words: "We are living in the world as it is; and, just as we Socialists cannot effectively enter our protest against capitalism by individual Anarchistic action or personal revolt, so neither can we usefully determine that each of us shall go his or her way in business, in pleasure, and particularly in sexual intercourse, regardless of the harm which our behavior may do to others. We ought not to take a serious step of this kind, we say, without considering the injury we may do to our own comrades, to our immediate family connections, or—which is perhaps the most important point of all—to the children which we may bring into the world, who have no say as to the terms on which they shall be begotten." That is to say, until complete Socialism is established, and the whole machine is started by the central authority, no individual should presume to act upon his own judgment. It does not matter whether one is right or wrong; he must do nothing which will

in any way tend to prejudice stupid folk against "the cause." He must subordinate himself and live "in the world as it is." He must follow the crowd; "personal revolt" is interdicted. Now, this is exceedingly wise teaching for State Socialism. To encourage *any* kind of personal initiative or revolt is to undermine the foundation of the future "State." People who will rebel now will rebel later, too. The individual must obey the majority, and, if he happens to disagree with it, he must wait till he converts, by "abstract reasoning" (how thankful we must be that *that* is allowed!), this same hostile majority.

Judge Ingraham, of the New York supreme court, has made a striking decision in a case involving the question of a mother's right to her children. "No father," said the judge, "has a right to steal a child from the mother under any circumstances," and he continued as follows: "Modern civilization requires that the right of the mother be recognized. There is no longer that relic of barbarism which holds the wife as the slave of her husband. Marital slavery has been abolished. Who has borne the children and suffered for them?" Judge Ingraham is too sanguine, doubtless. It is true that, as the disposition of children is within the equity powers of courts, progressive judges can ignore the technical questions and decide in accordance with "modern civilization"; but is it equally true that a bigoted and reactionary judge would feel bound to respect "modern civilization"? A few swallows don't make summer, and a few liberal judges don't abolish marital slavery. The equity powers of courts can be, and have been, used as instruments of tyranny and slavery, particularly in industrial relations, and cannot be regarded as an effective shield.

Collectivists have a fine opportunity to expose the inconsistency and superficiality of the alleged individualists of the *bourgeois* press, and they will doubtless improve it. Chicago has, by a popular vote, adopted a modified form of the Australian "Torrens land title system," the essential feature of which consists in registration and guarantee by the State of the titles to real estate. Simple registry, for a fee, carries the title under the guarantee of government. The government officials search titles, and once for all determine the question of ownership. The transfer of real estate and passing of title are rendered very easy,—a mere assignment of a certificate issued by the government being sufficient. The point that this arrangement is essentially State Socialistic does not seem to have been raised with any

clearness or force by any one in or out of Chicago. But the New York "Evening Post," in an editorial commendatory of the reform, dimly perceiving the difficulty, proceeds to explain it away as follows: "There are certain things which have been proved by experience to be what may be called commercial attributes of government. Civilization could not exist unless the centralized power controlled the issue of money; in like manner we expect the government, for the common good of all, to oversee banking and to assure so far as possible the insolvency of insurance companies. If it is granted that the ownership of land is a thing which, in the interest of everybody, ought to be made as easy and as certain as possible, and if it seems practicable to arrive at that desideratum in no other way, it becomes at once a question whether the oversight of government is not as proper as in the case of banking and insurance. This registering of title under government auspices is, as it is easy to see, a very different matter from the active employment of government in manufacturing, with which some would confuse it." Such loose talk about the conditions of civilization is just what State Socialists delight in, and they can make out a much stronger case in favor of government control of industry than the "Post" can in favor of supervision of banking, insurance, and transfer of land titles. Note, however, the "Post's" significant "if." "If it seems practicable to arrive at that desideratum in no other way"! Is it not the business of these alleged individualistic organs to answer this very question? It is generally admitted that the title-guarantee companies have proved very successful, and, if their charges are somewhat higher than, perhaps, they ought to be, normal competition is certain to force a reduction in due course of time. Again, if a more perfect and universal system of insurance is desired, there is no obstacle in the way of accomplishing it by a coöperative and mutual system. Even the most confirmed collectivists cannot claim that there is any pressing necessity for government insurance of title; they merely allege general convenience and desirability. The absence or lack of intelligent opposition to this scheme throws light on the character of *bourgeois* individualism in the United States. It is merely another name for defence of privilege. It is only when monopoly is attacked that the cry of "let alone" is raised; when competition is interfered with and the functions of government are enlarged at the expense of genuine voluntarism, they are dumb. They have neither motive or intelligence for effective championship of principles.

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"In abolishing rent and interest, the last vestiges of old-time slavery, the Revolution abolishes at one stroke the sword of the executioner, the seal of the magistrate, the club of the policeman, the gauge of the exciseman, the evading-knife of the department clerk, all those insignia of Politics, which young Liberty grinds beneath her heel." — FREUDRON.

The appearance in the editorial column of articles over other signatures than the editor's initial indicates that the editor approves their central purpose and general tenor, though he does not hold himself responsible for every phrase or word. But the appearance in other parts of the paper of articles by the same or other writers by no means indicates that he disapproves them in any respect, such disposition of them being governed largely by motives of convenience.

A Consistent Christian Reformer.

In these days of triumphant hypocrisy and militant ignorance, when followers of the Prince of peace are shouting for war against the Chinese and the Turks, and ministers of the gospel, like Parkhurst, shriek for the speedy execution of boys accused of train-wrecking, it is refreshing indeed to meet with a true Christian who is intelligent and manly enough to accept the teaching of the gospel without quibbling reservations, and to insist on squaring conduct with the principles supposed to be the standard of our "Christian" civilization. I refer to Ernest H. Crosby, son of the late Dr. Howard Crosby and president of the New York Social Reform Club. Mr. Crosby is a man of ability and earnestness. He has championed the cause of labor against legal usurpation and tyranny, and has advocated certain important constitutional reforms. Of late he has been explicitly promulgating the principle of non-resistance in the literal and absolute sense in which Tolstoi presents it. He has prepared an exhaustive statement showing that all the recorded sayings and doings of Christ, with possibly one exception of by no means striking significance, on the subjects of life, liberty, property, and law or governmental authority, clearly and irresistibly point to the conclusion that absolute non-resistance to evil, contempt for all worldly interests, and the fullest freedom to do right or wrong are enjoined upon all Christians. No man of logical mind can read Mr. Crosby's analysis and successfully dispute his conclusions. So far as I am aware, no religious editor has attempted to refute Mr. Crosby. It would be extremely interesting to have the bloodthirsty Parkhurst or the jingoistic "Independent" engage in serious controversy with him.

During the late exciting campaign in New York, Mr. Crosby definitively abjured politics in a letter to a newspaper, from which I quote the following with great pleasure:

The fact is—and we shall all learn it some day—that the world will never be improved by ambitious men,—that is, by politics; nor by force,—that is, by gov-

ernment. Politics is a selfish game, whether it be played at Westminster, St. Petersburg, or New York, and nothing is to be hoped from men engaged in such sport. To enter the field with them you must play their game, and true reformers had better keep out of it. On the other hand, reform by force—by law courts and policemen—is very sure in the long run to do more harm than good. We need a more delicate instrument than the right hand of violence to make the world better.

The perfected state, the kingdom of heaven of the gospels, cannot be manufactured by legislatures; it must be the outgrowth of a new life, and to awaken that life—in other words, to arouse the public conscience and call forth the unselfish devotion of individual men, and, through them, of society—is the proper business of reformers.

This is Tolstoian. It is Christian. It is logical, and follows strictly from the premises accepted by Mr. Crosby.

I hardly need state that I regard non-resistance as wholly unscientific, and Christian ethics as impracticable and undesirable. It has never been demonstrated that restraint and punishment are not a preventive of aggression, and hence loose and sentimental talk about love of one's enemies and reform solely by moral means can have no effect on minds guided by purely scientific ideas and methods. To insist on equality of freedom, on the right to do "wrong" in non-invasive ways, is one thing; to insist on absolute freedom, on non-resistance to murder, robbery, and any personal violence, is a totally different thing. Scientific men are led to the former conclusion by purely logical processes; of the latter no one would now dream, were it not found in a book believed to be inspired, for there is nothing in experience, societary or individual, to justify it. The millions who profess to follow Christ in spite of their direct and constant disregard of this principle of non-resistance doubtless instinctively feel the utter impossibility of its application, and are to be blamed, not for this neglect, but for the ignorance or hypocrisy which leads them to pretend to be what they are not. If a man is a Christian, he is bound to be a non-resistant. Those who feel that they cannot accept this principle confess that they distrust Christ and cannot make him their guide. Mr. Crosby is a Christian; hence he is a non-resistant. Convince him that non-resistance is neither possible or desirable, and he will renounce Christianity. He is no intellectual coward, nor is he a disciple of those transcendental philosophers to whom words mean everything and nothing.

The only attempt to overthrow Mr. Crosby's position that has been made is found in an editorial in the "Voice," which perceives that Mr. Crosby's Christianity would do away with prohibitionism. The arguments of the "Voice" are, however, singularly weak and superficial. In the first place, it says:

The counsel to the disciples not to resist violence with force was undoubtedly a necessary precaution, from a worldly standpoint, for they were a handful of weak men who, like the Christian missionaries in interior China, were sure to bring down destruction upon themselves by any other than a passive course. And, moreover, the disciples also, we are told, were endued with supernatural powers.

The "Voice" is very religious, yet to what an insignificant place it relegates the Bible in this hypothesis. Instead of being a guide for all men at all times, it makes it a sort of pocket manual for the handful of disciples. What

is its authority for this startling decree? All the passages collected by Mr. Crosby are plainly addressed to all men and are meant for all men. Christ spoke to the disciples, but he laid down the law, not for them alone, but for the whole world. The "Voice," recklessly disregarding all the evidence, seeks to avoid an inconvenient conclusion by *inferring*, and inferring *gratuitously*, that Christ meant the disciples alone instead of the world at large, which he came to redeem and save. To Mr. Crosby's abundant proofs nothing is opposed by the "Voice" except a gratuitous assumption, an inference for which no ground can be shown! Who will be satisfied with such reasoning?

But the "Voice" tries to nonplus Mr. Crosby by submitting this "supreme test":

If a man cannot rightly resist with force an assault upon his person, can a woman resist such an assault upon her honor? Is it possible that Christ taught a doctrine that makes it a woman's Christian duty to submit to any beast of a man that may assail her? Is it not unthinkable? And yet, if the doctrine of absolute non-resistance, as now promulgated, be well founded, it must apply to such a case.

The answer to this is two-fold. Mr. Crosby can say to the "Voice": "My dear fellow-Christian, your great difficulty should be brought, not to me, but to our common master and guide. I can but follow his clear teaching; I must apply common sense and logic to the interpretation of his words, but I cannot presume to challenge his principles. The only question is: am I right in my interpretation? Is it possible, is it reasonable, to interpret him otherwise? I say that it is not. His words and acts mean non-resistance and nothing else. I cannot escape that conclusion, and, if you do escape it, you must show better grounds than the baseless assumption you have just made. There are, to be sure, difficulties in the way of non-resistance; it may indeed seem an unthinkable doctrine, but what have I to do with that? Christ knew what he was about, and we must believe him. Is non-resistance more unthinkable than the immaculate conception, the trinity, the whole plan of redemption by sacrifice, and other Christian mysteries? Yet you profess to accept these, regardless of the protest of reason, simply because you cannot interpret the words relating to them in any other manner. You are bound to accept non-resistance for the same reason."

In the second place, the "supreme test" is really no test at all. It is a comical illustration of the tendency of the illogical to strain at the particular after swallowing the general of which it is part,—a tendency to which Mr. Tucker has recently had occasion to refer. Mr. Crosby calmly says that he favors absolute non-resistance to evil of any kind, and that he would not protect by force life or liberty or property. The "Voice" hears this without being startled. Suddenly a concrete and particular instance of evil or violence occurs to it, and it exclaims: "Ah! here is a supreme test! Would you have a woman submit to rape?" But isn't rape merely a form of violence, and didn't Mr. Crosby explicitly state that he was against resistance to *any* evil? Why is rape a "supreme test"? In view of the "Voice's" logic, the wonder is that it did not make its test still more "supreme" by asking if, in Mr. Crosby's view, a husband and wife should

refrain from resisting rape attempted upon the latter in the presence of the former? How unfortunate that the "Voice" did not hit upon *this* test? It would not have embarrassed Mr. Crosby more, but think of its effect on illogical readers!

V. Y.

An Unconscious Anarchist.

Rev. F. M. Foster, a New York Presbyterian clergyman, explains in the "Voice" a remark he made before the recent election, to the effect that a Christian cannot vote under present conditions. "If you cast a vote," he says, "you thereby declare that the will of the majority shall rule," and, if you are opposed to a certain thing and try to fight it at the polls, you tacitly agree to abide by the result. If you are defeated, you are bound to acquiesce in the decision of the majority, and have no cause for complaint.

This, of course, is eminently sound, but the "Voice" attempts to challenge the reasoning as follows:

It is very true that by voting we have expressed our willingness that the majority shall rule; but we have not expressed any agreement with *the way in which it rules*. We have agreed to submit to the will of the majority,—that is all,—until we can change it. Has not Mr. Foster done the same thing, even though he did not vote? Is he not submitting to that decree every day? The difference between us is that he submits without using his constitutional privilege to register his protest, while we have registered ours.

The distinction made by the "Voice" is purely verbal. No one implies that voting is equivalent to a final and absolute approval of the majority's way of ruling; the right to agitate further and try to change the opinions of the majority is, of course, not waived or surrendered. But non-voters have the same right; voting adds nothing to it. The voter consents that the majority shall rule him in its own way, until he succeeds in changing its views, and it is this consent which the Rev. Mr. Foster desires to withhold. How can he do it *except* by abstention? To say that the non-voter consents by his staying away is manifestly absurd, for it would follow that there is no way in which non-consent can be expressed or manifested. Is it rational to say that the man who protests openly against an act and declines to have anything to do with the political machinery which others see fit to resort to does consent, after all? As for registering one's protest, the "Voice" omits to show that it is of any importance to register it by voting. There are other ways of doing it, and the whole contention is that those ways which do not involve acceptance of the *principle* of majority are superior.

There is more logic in the remarks next made by the "Voice." It says:

The position which Mr. Foster takes—and he speaks for a religious denomination—would render any system of government impossible. To accept his premises and conclusions is to make all form of social organization impracticable. The only recourse for him is to deny that there should be any government. Without knowing it, he is already a philosophical Anarchist.

Doubtless the "Voice" intended to say that Mr. Foster's position would render any form of *compulsory* social organization impossible, for it knows that Anarchism is not incompatible with voluntary organizations of any kind. With this amendment, what it says is true.

Mr. Foster objects to majority rule, and to this rule there are no other alternatives than minority rule and no rule (Anarchy). As he cannot be construed to favor minority rule, he must hold the Anarchistic view of government. He is to be congratulated. It is to be hoped that he is logical and consistent enough to perceive that his warfare upon the saloon (since he wishes to destroy the saloon) must be confined to passive and non-aggressive methods. He may preach against it, denounce it, boycott it, but he may not use any force against it, open or disguised. Is this his real position?

V. Y.

Lloyd vs. Laughlin.

Prof. Laughlin, of the Chicago University, in referring to the charges growing out of the Bemis case, is reported as remarking that, "whatever might be charged against one of the founders of the oil monopoly [Mr. Rockefeller], no one could say that he had accumulated his millions in any way that interfered with the accumulations of others." Henry D. Lloyd promptly challenged this assertion in an open letter to the professor, in which he wrote as follows:

In 1885 the supreme court of Ohio found, as reported in volume 43 of the Ohio State reports, that the monopoly had a freight contract with the Lake Shore railroad "to keep the price down for the favored customer and up for all others," and the court said: "The inevitable tendency and effect of this contract was to enable 'this company' to ruin all other operators and drive them out of business," and the court annulled the contract as "unlawful."

With the help of such unlawful contracts the capital of the oil monopoly has increased in thirty years from nothing to hundreds of millions of dollars. If this were not a public matter, you would not have discussed it at a public meeting. Allow me, therefore, to ask a question of you, as the head of one of the most important departments of political economy in the country.

If this way of accumulating millions by the help of unlawful contracts to ruin all other operators is not an interference with the accumulation of others, what is the "scientific" name for it, and for the kind of political economy which it commends for imitation to the young men and women of the country?

From the standpoint common, in this respect, to challenger and challenged, this question can be answered in but one way. Prof. Laughlin is bound to concur in the court's view, and to retract his assertion regarding the legitimacy of Mr. Rockefeller's methods. For, while Prof. Laughlin is generally considered an individualist economist, his individualism, like that of so many others who take the name in vain, is confined to opposition to increased State interference in the interest of labor. He is not consistent or thoroughgoing, and would not question the soundness of such legislation as the interstate commerce act and such decisions as have been rendered by a number of judges in cases against trusts. Hence, acquiescing in the view referred to by Mr. Lloyd, he cannot escape the logical conclusion to which it leads.

But, while Mr. Lloyd has silenced Prof. Laughlin, he has not made out his case. He must surely be aware that there are many who reject the court's view, and who hold that contracts with railroads involving "favoritism" and discrimination are entirely legitimate. There is usually some good business reason for what is loosely denounced as favoritism, and

there is no warrant for depriving railroads of the freedom to do that which other traders do regularly and systematically,—"discriminate" in favor of better customers. The interstate commerce law is a piece of demagogic legislation, and decisions rendered under it are theoretically worthless. Hence, even if Mr. Rockefeller has accumulated his millions by the aid of railroad discrimination, there has been no improper interference with the accumulation of others. If that were the only charge, the defendant would have to be acquitted.

Of course, the fact is that Mr. Rockefeller's millions have been accumulated under a system which prevents accumulation by all but a few; and, if he has not interfered with others, it is simply because the State has done it for him. But for monopoly and legal privilege with respect to natural opportunities and credit, he could not have accumulated his millions, while many of those who have been ruined or thwarted would be independent and prosperous. Mr. Rockefeller's millions are not rightfully his, though personally he may be unconscious of any improper direct interference with anybody. It is the law which is constantly interfering to protect monopoly and keep down labor and industry, and against which attacks should be directed. Mr. Lloyd ought to see that the consequences of some of Mr. Rockefeller's perfectly *legal* acts—acts sustained by law, courts, churches, and public opinion—are far worse than the consequences of any of his *illegal* acts.

V. Y.

Defensive Association in Chicago.

A number of distinguished citizens of Chicago have formed an organization for protection against oppressive taxation. Other means having failed, they intend to appeal to the courts and public opinion for relief of taxpayers from special assessment frauds. They will also attempt to defeat by legal proceedings "ordinances corruptly or inconsiderately passed" for alleged street improvements. The "Chronicle" is displeased with what it calls "government by vigilance committees," and says:

If the city government were administered for the benefit and protection of citizens, private organizations for the defence of their rights would be unnecessary. The people do not organize for their own defence, except in cases where the government abdicates its powers and leaves them without the protection of law. The city administration left the work of street-cleaning for a while to be performed by private hands. The private hands are now idle, and the streets are not cleaned at all. Property owners are not protected from special assessment frauds, and are compelled to organize for their own protection. The police is worthless, and private detective agencies usurp the duty of protecting the peace. They arrest criminals on doubtful warrants, and shoot persons whom they mistake for criminals resisting arrest or escaping from a street hold up. This is about as near a state of anarchy as can be reached under the forms of municipal government.

The solution is worse than a state of Anarchy, for under that condition the taxpayers would not have to pay pretended officials for duties that are not performed. At present the taxpayers pay twice for everything; and the chances are that they will continue doing so, until they make the discovery that the government they still hope to reform must be reformed altogether. By the way, these private societies are all defensive, and hence do not

constitute private "government," such as is found in White Caps, anti-gambling leagues, Good Government clubs, and other meddling agencies.

V. Y.

Rights and Contract.

Having considered in the last issue Mr. Lloyd's departure from Anarchism and its motives and bearings, it remains to consider his arguments on the child question and the contrasting fundamental positions in accordance with one of which it must be settled. The reader should refresh his memory by reference to Mr. Lloyd's letter and my comments in No. 322, and his later letter in No. 325.

The constant difficulty that besets Mr. Lloyd in his political discussions is his inability to distinguish between that which *it is right to do*—that is, that which it is necessary to do in order to attain the end in view—and that which one *has a right to do*—that is, that which one's fellows agree to let him do in peace and undisturbed. Now, the whole matter of scientific politics is a question how far we had better give each other a *right to do* that which each may think *it is right to do*. Of course it may be said further, and correctly, that this again is but a question of what *it is right*—that is, best or necessary—to give each other a *right to do*. But, whatever the conclusion that may be reached upon this point, it is clear that it can be put into execution only through contract, agreement, between those undertaking thus to "give each other" the right determined upon. In the absence of such a contract *the right to do* does not exist at all. It has not been called into existence. Under these non-political conditions a certain course may be *right* in the sense that it is the straight course to a certain end, but *rights* in the political sense there then are none. If a man then pursue one course or another, it is solely by virtue of the fact that he has a natural and non-conventional power to pursue it. We may express this loosely, as I often do, by saying that under such conditions might is right; but the phrase is not accurate. It is more accurate, and it is sufficient, to say simply that might is might, and end it there. Rights begin only with convention. They are not the liberties that exist through natural power, but the liberties that are created by mutual guarantee.

Now, supposing ourselves assembled to establish this guarantee, to make our contract, to determine what it is right, best, necessary, to give each other a right to do, Mr. Lloyd may very properly take the floor to maintain that it is not right, best, necessary, to give any human being property in another human being, and that it is right, best, necessary, to guarantee equal liberty to all human beings. *But he must prove it.* His proposition is not an axiom; it is open to dispute. Its mere assertion does not establish it; no more is it established by spelling Natural Right with a big N and a big R. Mr. Lloyd must marshal his evidence. If he does not do so, I claim the floor and maintain that it is not right—that is, best—to guarantee equal liberty to all human beings, for the reason that such a guarantee is inconsistent with the one purpose common to all the contracting parties,—namely, the security of each of them in the control of their persons and the results of their efforts,—and that

to the accomplishment of this purpose the necessary thing is a guarantee of equal liberty to all persons capable of entertaining the idea of contract. And in support of this contention I offer in detail the various considerations which I have urged in my articles upon this subject.

When Mr. Lloyd shall overthrow the two preceding paragraphs, he will be justified in claiming that he is not under the *régime* of contract; but, until then, he necessarily is under that *régime*, and bound by his own admissions to accept its logical consequence of property in babies. If he shall attempt to overthrow them, let him not accuse me of abandoning the ground which I took in No. 322. In discarding the phrases "right of might," "right of invasion," etc. (which I may return to, for convenience, in some future discussion in which it may be less necessary to speak with strict accuracy), I do not change my position at all, but simply so confine my use of terms as to reduce to a minimum the chance of misunderstanding.

So far Mr. Lloyd has backed his denial of the contract *régime* by only one argument,—that society cannot be founded upon contract because no individual is under any obligation to keep his contract, and therefore it is obligatory upon his fellows to refrain from enforcing the contract upon him. The final inference is unwarrantable. It is the contrary, rather, that follows. There is no moral obligation upon the individual either to make a contract, or to keep a contract after making it; and, similarly, there is no moral obligation upon his fellows, with whom he may have made a contract, to allow him to repudiate the contract. There is no moral obligation at all on either side. A contract is made voluntarily, for mutual advantage. For its violation penalties are fixed. If a contracting party chooses to violate, he suffers these penalties, provided the other parties have the desire and power to enforce them. And that is all there is to it. Such an arrangement is shown by experience to be practicable. Therefore a society can be founded upon it. "Not a true society," says Mr. Lloyd. As to that, I don't know. At any rate, a society that accomplishes its purpose.

The makers of a general contract guaranteeing equal liberty to all those capable of contracting would not enforce the particular contract supposed by Mr. Lloyd, whereby a man should agree to be a slave for life, or any other contract inconsistent with the general contract.

Mr. Lloyd's explanation of his cripple illustration does not establish at all his right to dictate the cripple's manner of living. If there is no agreement between Mr. Lloyd and the cripple whereby the latter agrees to conform to the former's wishes in the matter of diet in return for his food-supply, then, as Mr. Lloyd says, the food furnished the cripple by Mr. Lloyd is a free gift. But such a gift is no justification of authority over the cripple. Mr. Lloyd, producing apples and oranges, can give the cripple apples if he chooses, but it is not by giving him apples that Mr. Lloyd acquires the right to forbid him to touch the oranges. He, as producer of the oranges, has a right, under the general contract, to forbid him to touch the oranges, even though he does not give him apples or anything else. Nor does the "free gift" of apples give Mr. Lloyd "a

right to tell the cripple to eat apples." The cripple has a perfect right to refuse to eat the apples that Mr. Lloyd gives him. The matter of authority and dictation does not enter into the case at all. The most that can be said is that, if the cripple finds it impossible to obtain food in any other manner, it happens to be in Mr. Lloyd's power to place before the cripple the alternative of eating apples or starving to death. But this is not enough to substantiate Mr. Lloyd's declaration that the cripple is his subject. Dependence and subjection are different things. In the same sense, though not in the same degree, that the cripple is dependent upon Mr. Lloyd are all the people in the world dependent one upon another. But this does not make them the subjects one of another. There is a sense in which no man is free, but in the political sense—and we are now talking politics—Mr. Lloyd's cripple is as free as any man on earth. If the cripple is the subject of those who give him alms, then the storekeeper is the subject of the customers who bestow on him their patronage, and upon whom he is dependent for his livelihood. But to accept that conclusion is to misuse terms and misunderstand politics. As I said in my previous article, this illustration has little bearing on the matter in hand; I discuss it only because Mr. Lloyd brought it forward and because it throws light on his peculiar reasoning.

One reason why it has little bearing is that Mr. Lloyd's relation to the cripple, based on his *free gift* of food, is not at all analogous to the relation of parent to child, if, as Mr. Lloyd declares, the parent *owes* the child support. Even were it to be admitted (though it cannot be) that the *gift* to the cripple establishes a degree of authority over him, it could not be allowed for a moment that the *payment of a debt* to the child establishes the smallest authority over it or claim upon it. The curious notions of debit and credit which Mr. Lloyd showed in recent criticisms on Mr. Badcock are revealed again here. To say that a parent owes support to a child, but may determine the form of that support, is equivalent to saying that the parent owes nothing at all. For there is no legal debt—that is to say, no debt of which third parties may take cognizance—where the determination of the debt belongs exclusively to the debtor. As to the child's debt to the parent, if such indebtedness falls upon the child "as a member of free society" (which, by the way, I deny, for the child of whom I am talking is not a member of any society), it differs in no wise from the debt of every other member of free society to this same parent, and is entirely independent of parental support of the child. So the "flagrant contradiction" and "mental suicide" which Mr. Lloyd asks me to locate lie precisely where they lay before,—in claiming in the same breath that the parent owes something to the child and yet is entitled to exact something from the child in return for payment of the debt.

Mr. Lloyd, in his first letter, said that "the parent, having forced dependent life upon the child, is an invader, if refusing support to this dependent individual." I answered that the stock-breeder who refuses support to a calf is equally an invader. Yes, rejoins Mr. Lloyd, but what we want is human equal liberty, which begins and ends with human beings. Once more,

assertion without proof. This is the question at issue. I say that what we want is that equal liberty which begins and ends with beings capable of grasping the idea of contract, and I have given proof of this in an elaborate argument which has not been refuted.

From this point Mr. Lloyd proceeds with a succession of exclamatory remarks prompted by my contention that Anarchy does not exclude slavery or ownership of the mentally undeveloped, and indicative, despite the declaration of his perfect calmness at the opening of his article, of a high degree of excitement. And he himself suggests the words that are accurately descriptive of these remarks. They are essentially superstitious. They belong to the lingo of religion. They are based on the old idea that man is a special creature, for whose benefit the rest of the universe was intended. They are in the last degree absurd. Man is a special being only in the sense that he is, on the whole, the most developed and most powerful being. He is an incident in the universe, and in all probability will some day be summarily extinguished in universal processes. The universe was not intended for his benefit. If he, for some trifling period of a million years or so, happens to be able to in a degree submit it to his uses, by all means he should do so. That he should defend himself against the universe is only natural. But that he is sacred is sheer nonsense. There is no more reason in saying that man should not be property because he is human than there would be in saying that dogs should not be property because they are canine. To Mr. Lloyd's arbitrary distinction how much I prefer the attitude of Mr. Badcock, who, in his sympathy with every creature that can feel, is as ready to abolish property in animals as to prohibit property in children! His method of minimizing pain seems to me a mistaken and ineffective one, but at least he bows before no spooks.

"The slavery of babes and fools is the meanest and most cowardly of all," Mr. Lloyd tells us. Why? That he does not tell us. It may be more cowardly to enslave a babe than to enslave a lion, but it is certainly not more so than to enslave a lamb. The sentence quoted is as silly sentimentalism as that which declares it more cowardly to hang a woman than a man. A woman's physical inferiority disappears entirely in the equal helplessness of man and woman when confronted individually by collective power. And similarly babes and domestic animals are alike defenceless against grown men.

"It is enough for me to know that you and I, Mr. Tucker, would never be safe in any society which did not hold the life and liberty of every human being sacred." Yes, I know, Mr. Lloyd, that that is enough for you. Your mind is one that accepts with very little evidence that which it wishes to believe. Mine is more exacting. Your assertion that you know this or that is not enough for me. Tell me how you know it. I insist upon that. For my part, I should feel as easy regarding my own safety, and much easier regarding the safety of my children, in a society affording protection only to the mentally developed, as persons, and protecting the mentally undeveloped only as property.

Mr. Lloyd's contention that the unimpre-

nated ovum does not contain the possibilities of the child is of no force. If such be the case, then there are no possibilities in anything, for all new powers are the result of new combinations. So judged, the impregnated ovum has not the possibilities of the child, for it will never become a child unless it derives the necessary sustaining forces from the mother's organism. And by the same reasoning the child at birth has not the possibilities of the man, for it will never become a man unless it effects a combination with air and food. But, if we take the other course and, admitting that the child has the possibilities of the man, declare that therefore it cannot be property, then we must also for the same reason say that the ovum in a woman's body is not her property,—an absurdity patent even to Mr. Lloyd. It is comforting to know that there are still some things incredible even to one who believes that a woman, when made to conceive by an act of rape, thereby loses her right of suicide, and that a man who has just developed from a monkey is bound to compensate his former owner for the loss of property caused by this development. But such conclusions are calculated to discourage one from addressing the reason that accepts them. *Après cela, il faut tirer l'échelle.*

A fortnight hence we will talk of Mr. Badcock. T.

Secretary Carlisle recently delivered an address on the currency before the New York chamber of commerce. The "Herald" said he had presented "most intricate questions" with masterly simplicity; the "Evening Post" is ashamed that such a personage should be called upon to deliver himself of so "elementary truths and platitudes" before such an audience, and thinks the fact a sad commentary on our intelligence; while the "Press" and other Republican sheets describe the secretary's statements as obvious falsehoods and childish perversions of notorious facts. And yet this great American press wishes to solve the financial question!

J. Wm. Lloyd's "Wind-Harp Songs" are ready, and the book can be procured of the author. I am highly pleased with it. It far exceeds my anticipations, which, I confess, were not raised by the author's article in Liberty some months ago, written to herald his little volume. We Free Socialists can boast of a remarkable poet in our Comrade Lloyd.

Anarchist Letter-Writing Corps.

The Secretary wants every reader of Liberty to send in his name for enrolment. Those who do so thereby pledge themselves to write, when possible, a letter every fortnight, on Anarchism or kindred subjects, to the "target" assigned in Liberty for that fortnight, and to notify the secretary promptly in case of any failure to write to a target (which it is hoped will not often occur), or in case of temporary or permanent withdrawal from the work of the Corps. All, whether members or not, are asked to lose no opportunity of informing the secretary of suitable targets. Address, STEPHEN T. BYINGTON, Flushing Institute, Flushing, N. Y.

I beg pardon of the members of the Corps for a slip of my pen in the last number of Liberty, by which I seemed to imply that some had made promises which they did not mean to keep. I had no intention of making such a charge, and could not have justified it if I had. What I meant was that some make promises, doubtless sincere, and afterward forget them,—which is bad enough.

The "Voice," target two months ago, has, up to

date of writing, printed three of the shots it then received.

Target, section A.—Ernest H. Crosby, 120 Broadway, New York city, the leader of the high-license movement in the New York legislature a few years ago, has given up faith in high license and in all liquor legislation. In reply to inquiries from the "Voice," he writes:

The clipping is substantially correct. I believe that one of the chief features of Christianity and one that is often overlooked, is non-resistance to evil by force. Christ taught this repeatedly by word and example. It is a great mistake to attempt to secure the spread of morality by legislation, which means by police and sheriffs. The principle is absolutely unchristian in my opinion.

I may add that I am a teetotaler myself.

The "Voice's" comments contain the following:

Mr. Crosby, however, it seems, has gone on to a much farther point. He holds that the law against theft and murder is also wrong. He maintains that it and all such laws are exhibitions of force, and that the use of force in resisting evil is contrary to the teaching of Christ. He stands with Tolstol. He sends us a leaflet, reprinted from "The Kingdom," containing his argument on this point; and the conclusion he reaches is that a Christian has no right to use force in resisting evil, even though it be to defend his property, his liberty, or his life. . . . Mr. Crosby is not a crank. He is a respected member of society. His father was the late Dr. Howard Crosby. He, the son, is president of the Social Reform Club, and reasons sanely and temperately on the topics that come up for discussion.

Mr. Crosby, I believe, is also a Single Taxer. How he reconciles this with non-resistance I don't know. Urge him to see what great evils are caused by the use of force methods to regulate all parts of social life,—in business as well as in morals,—and to make the removal of these evils an object of vigorous effort.

Section B.—Hon. Thos. E. Watson, editor "People's Party Paper," Thomson, Ga., said editorially last summer.

Annul all laws which create monopoly, class privilege, special exemption, and you would have in this republic a state of things in which each man would reap as he sowed, acquire as he produced. . . . Never has there been real advancement, the accumulation of wealth, and the education and refinement which can only be had with the accumulation of wealth, until each citizen was given an incentive to develop his individuality.

The heart and soul of Jeffersonian democracy is the lifting of the individual.

You are as good as any other man; the world's honors and its wealth are as much yours as any other man's; the destiny of the republic rests as much upon your vote as upon anybody's; what you produce shall be yours; obey the law, and no man shall take from that which is yours,—such is the language of pure democracy to the citizen.

Could anything be fairer? Could any system better adapt itself to the grandest possibilities, the noblest aspirations, of the human race?

Be as fraternal, as charitable, as self-sacrificing as you like—that's your own affair; democracy does not dictate how kind and loving you shall be to your neighbor. It requires of you to treat him justly, and human law can do no more.

Now, as to Socialism. It merges the individual in the mass; it makes a hotch potch of society; it takes away the chief incentive to individual effort; it makes each work for the good of all, and the individual who does most must take his pay in a general average reduced by those who work least. Socialism is powerless in dealing with the indolent, the vicious, and the incompetent.

Show him that the whole scheme of having men regulate each other is contrary to his principles, and deserves the condemnation he passes on Socialism; show how these principles demand a change going to the very bottom of our system of government, and how much good is to be hoped for from such a change.

STEPHEN T. BYINGTON.

A Treasonable Phonograph.

[New York Sun.]

Having possession of a seditious phonograph is the latest instance of disloyalty punished by a jealous continental monarch. The authorities at Trieste arrested an Italian guilty of having exhibited a phonograph which played the Italian Royal March. The terrible instrument was accused of having disturbed public order because it also registered sundry demonstrations of applause and enthusiastic cries which accompanied the hymn when it was performed. The musical patriot has been obliged to leave the town, and take with him the subversive instrument.

"Search the Scriptures."

[Written in reply to an admonition from a friend that it would greatly benefit the author to search the Scriptures.]

"Search the Scriptures," and you'll find
Anything to suit your mind.
If you wish to have a spree,
Or would marry two or three,—
Yea, a thousand, more or less,—
"The Book" will tell you how, I guess.
If to murder you're inclined,
God will justify your mind,
And will sanction all you do,—
If "The Church" is in it too.
If you'd like to cheat the blind,
Bunco those of feeble mind,
Sacrifice your only daughter,
Cause men's blood to flow like water,
Rob the helpless, aid the rich,
"The Scriptures" give examples which
Will show you so well how to do it
That God will help you safely through it.
Or, if you would be forgiving,
Kindly, helpful, cheerful, loving,
You will find superb example
That will give incentive ample.
"Search the Scriptures"! Yea, so do,
But search *other books* so, too,
And, whatever good you find,
Let impregnate all your mind,
Separating good from evil,
Not by aid of "God" or "Devil,"
But by knowledge purely human
Gained by every man and woman.
By prefixing "D" to "evil"
You don't make a fiercer Devil,
But another "O" in "God"
Gives it meaning high and broad.
So, when you "The Scriptures" search,
Don't let superstition, "Church,"
Or any fear of "Holy Wrath"
Tempt you out of truth's straight path,
But let reason, sound and true,
Guide you in whate'er you do.

Here's the moral to my rhyme:
Use your life while yet there's time;
Enjoy yourself; treat all men well;
And then, while here on earth you dwell,
You'll know, hereafter come what may,
You lived for life, and not decay.

W. W. C.

Is the Trade Union Anarchistic?

To the Editor of Liberty:

Just a few words in reply to Mr. Cohen. I will not exploit your space by touching on any of the "ifs" and "may bes" that are not essential to the main point under discussion, which is: "Are trade unions the most thoroughly Anarchistic organizations in our present society?" Mr. Cohen, in his reply, says they are,—not because the men who are in them believe in freedom, but because the State allies itself with capital in fighting the unions, and so it often happens that labor finds itself arrayed against the State. This is a curious bit of reasoning for a plumb-liner. If to fight against the State, not necessarily because one believes in freedom, but because of something else (religious fanaticism, for instance), is Anarchistic, then the New York saloon-keepers are Anarchists, and the Seventh Day Adventists, and the woman suffragists, and the criminal classes, etc., and even the corporate monopolies when they resist inter-state commerce and anti-trust laws. Doesn't that prove too much? Besides, it does not even include trade unions when they confine themselves to passive resistance and boycott; according to this illustration, they must actively resist. This assumption that organized laborers are soldiers of freedom, whether consciously or not, and that capitalists and "scabs" are opposed to freedom, only needs developing to lead to demagoguery, and it was for this reason that I raised my protest against Cohen's effusion re the "Arena." If Cohen was not hypnotized by some of the fakirs who pulled the strings at the Denver convention, then I am at a loss to account for his logic.

But, says Cohen further, "a voluntary association for the mutual benefit of its members, using the boycott and other passive weapons in its fight against

capitalism and the State, is *very near* the Anarchist idea." Here the assumption is that trade unions are intelligently formed for the purpose of fighting capitalism and the State, in the sense that Anarchists use those terms, whereas Cohen knows that the trade unionist body is thoroughly orthodox, and believes in the extension of the functions of the State, accepts the teaching of orthodox political economy, and utterly opposes Anarchism. It is only a *very near* in that body who reject orthodox economy, *i. e.*, the Single Taxers and Socialists. So orthodox and stupid are the trade unionists that they resist the logical extension of their own principles by the State Socialist, and Cohen commends them for refusing to have these dogmas rammed down their throats. Cohen will not say that trade unions oppose State Socialism intelligently and in the light of Anarchism, when they endorse nationalization of railroads and telegraphs, and all the rest of the A. F. L. platform. And, by the way, why have not Socialists a right to agitate their theories in their unions, and thus turn their minority into a majority? Is there anything inconsistent in their agitation?

Another assumption in that voluntary association illustration is that a union is voluntary, like an insurance society or base-ball club or fraternal or religious bodies, and that one can secede at will, join or not join, as interest or pleasure prompts. There is no comparison in the cases. As well say that the government of New York or even of the United States is voluntary, and, if you don't like New York Sunday laws, etc., you can secede and go to—South Carolina. In what is called a strong union town a man cannot choose to join or secede. It is compulsory, unless he confines himself to some workshops which the trust has not reached. Today the right of a man to work in certain places, unless he consents to pay for the privilege and to submit to certain conditions which he (rightly or wrongly) considers unjust and outrageous, is much nearer Tammanyism than Anarchism. The official and conservative organ of the Typographical Union (June 15) says editorially: "Some men take to unionism, like a youngster takes to castor oil. Of course, the latter is not an act of voluntary submission, but one of coercion."

In joining the A. P. A., or the Catholic church, or the Grand Army, or a protective tariff club, one joins an organization for mutual benefit, using passive resistance and sometimes the boycott against outsiders, and in that sense are these Anarchistic organizations? They are certainly more free in their policy than unions: first, a man knows precisely what to expect, and, even if he miscalculates, he can secede without being hunted out of town,—except perhaps in rare instances, and then they are more like unions. To say that a union that levies compulsory taxes to support itself, and assessments for labor parades, badges, receptions, etc., and combines compulsory sick benefits and death benefits with support of "Homes," assessments for committees on government ownership of telegraphs, fines for non-attendance at meetings, fines for not parading on Labor Day, and penalties and assessments for anything that a majority may vote to be "for the good of the union,"—to say that such an organization is more Anarchistic than the Catholic church or the A. P. A. or the American Tobacco Company is to use misleading language.

When Cohen can point to a union that will include in its constitution articles similar to that of the Anti-Vaccination League on page 8, No. 326, of Liberty, I will be willing to make an exception. At present I maintain my original statement.

Cohen says I must have had some other union than his in mind, when I asserted the despotic features of unions, and says that he violated his pledge to support boycotts and received absolution after confession. What does that prove? Either that his union is very weak or undisciplined, or that his fellow-workmen were indulgent because equally or more guilty in some other boycott, or that Cohen was a good fellow personally and indulged, or that his union is too disorganized to enforce its own rules, or any other reason rather than that his union is very near an Anarchistic organization. If his union does not enforce any despotic actions of the majority, and has no compulsory features, I certainly did not mean his union; but, if he denies that unions as a rule embody despotic rules, then I shall have to encumber your columns with proofs. Meanwhile, here is a gem from the offi-

cial organ of the Typographical Union. It is the only piece of reading matter in the union line that I can now lay my hand on, but it is enough:

All the friends of organized labor should keep in sight the fact that Rudyard Kipling has in the "Century" an article on "The Walking Delegate," full of malice and misrepresentation. . . . Any workingman who would buy or read anything written by this conceited cockney, or who would patronize a magazine or paper that would print his rot, should be kicked out of his union organization.

That is an editorial utterance in an organ that I am "voluntarily" compelled to support. Of course it is not law, but it is a sentiment that would be enacted into law by many, if feasible: suppose Kipling should have his printing done in a label office!

I am afraid I have occupied too much space, and so I will not take up the economic argument, seeing that Cohen has nothing further to say than that trade unions have raised the wages of *some* men in *some* trades. I don't deny it; that is why I am union cannibal myself. But that they have any effect on the law of rent, or rate of interest, or tend to decrease profits,—this I deny. Cohen and his friends, who have organized to republish "Mutual Banking," could, with one year's income of a union like the International Cigar Makers', do more to improve the condition of the wage-workers than all trade unions put together.

With best feelings towards Cohen when plumb-line,
I remain, etc.,
A. H. SIMPSON.

BOSTON, NOVEMBER 26.

Property, Property.

To the Editor of Liberty:

If it is a truth (as you say, and I endorse) that "there is no production whatsoever which is not aided by and absolutely dependent upon the qualities inherent in matter, which the producer did not create," then let us acknowledge this truth in all its importance and not give credit to the wrong party. Let us not take it for granted that every labor-effort is entitled to all it can grab, nor yield rights on account of labor which labor has not earned. But let it be known that we hold in reserve our right or might (it had better be *might*) to protect the forces of nature from such offensive (to us) mutilations as human labor is capable of. H.'s claim over his child, on the sole ground he gives of "having produced my child myself," needs qualification by your own admission as above. If, when I said: "Parents are not producers of their children in the same sense that they are the producers of their handiwork," I had said to the same extent instead of *in the same sense*, my sentence would have been more accurate, and I apologize for carelessness. "If this proves anything, it proves too much and abolishes property altogether," say you. Not so, say I. It abolishes the idea that *property* ("right of possession"—Walker) can be indiscriminately based upon production, to the exclusion of other considerations.

Man's handiwork cannot be sharply demarcated off from nature's handiwork. The attempt to do so is as artificial as the other attempt to sharply demarcate the status of the child from that of the adult. If you persist in upholding the claims of labor before every other, you, necessarily, give up that part of your propaganda which claims for all equal access to the raw material of the universe. For this latter established proprietary or usufruct right, exclusively of producer's rights.

When labor is expended in enclosing and planting large areas of land, for use and occupancy as hunting-preserves, for a comparatively few people, to the effect that others are landless and have to pay a monopolistic rent in order to live, you will not allow that such expenditure of labor makes the land so dealt with the absolute property of the landlord or land-laborer. Nor will I. You, who won't grant more than a very limited ownership over land, yet grant absolute ownership over children. Yet the labor involved in breeding or catching these latter is often as small or smaller a part of the product as is the labor spent upon producing a park. In both cases it is the non-labor forces which predominate and force themselves upon our consciousness. Absolute ownership over land we cannot allow when we suffer thereby. Absolute ownership over children we can no more allow

for the same reason. If our suffering is great *re* the land, it is sometimes immense *re* the children.

That the laborer's labor is necessarily and indissolubly connected with the raw material and forces of the universe, and that his claim to his own production is no right unless he can also claim and keep the material and non-labor forces bound up with them, are weighty considerations to be taken into account in all disputes affecting *meum* and *tuum*. But they are not the only considerations. If ownership is to be determinable wholly and solely by the formula: the product to the producer, together with that part of the universe which happens to be attached thereto, slavery and land monopoly, not to mention worse inflections, receive sanctions on this labor-only basis. My *labor* may be devoted to catching slaves or in breeding them. The slaves may be human, bovine, canine, or feline. Are they really mine?

The destruction or mutilation of children, ancient monuments, cities, or any mortal thing, cannot be justified solely on the ground that the destroyer or mutilator produced them, as I have shown. Then, some other reason than the one based on "production" is required by those strong enough to demand an explanation before permitting (if they can help it) the continuance of acts which jeopardize their happiness. This necessarily follows, if my feelings and general interest in the world are to be equally considered with yours and everybody else's. In asserting my claim to be considered in the disposal of the forces and beauties of nature, and the important relics of past generations, which are all outside of present producers' productions, I base my claim upon my manhood with all its feelings, and not upon my labor power; and am so far careful of others' liberties that I only require that their labors shall not injure me.

A few years back, some Egyptians exploited the pyramids for building stone and thereby pained many antiquaries. Recently the most magnificent trees, the pride and glory of this (now benighted) neighborhood, were sacrificed in order to give place to bricks and mortar, to the great sorry of yours truly and nearly everybody else except those peculiarly interested in the change. Now I certainly weigh the pain caused by these deeds against the pleasure and profit of the exploiters, and such pain would influence my decision on any jury that had to act in such matters.

For many years (and I am not sure the practice is yet stopped) all tobacco and some other goods seized from those trying to smuggle into the port of London were burned in a furnace known as the Queen's pipe. The value so destroyed has been enormous. I would uphold the right of any one to save anything from that furnace, such right being quite independent of the fact that government obtained the goods in the first place by invasion. This latter fact would certainly justify more force being used against the government or other invaders than against those who acquired the goods by fair means. In the latter case I do not think the person desirous of saving value intended to be destroyed should have any redress if he fails; and I might hold him liable if, in his attempts, he injured the would-be destroyer. Cases can be imagined in which it would be difficult to decide where the balance of aggression lay. Those uncertainties are always likely to appear under any system of trials. Suppose a pupil desirous of rescuing some sketch which the master has thrown into the fire-grate. Suppose the master considered his reputation at stake, if the sketch was allowed to exist. Nothing succeeds like success. Decide the rights of the case, if you can. A vase which some old Roman iconoclast ordered to be destroyed may be saved by some menial, and turn up again two thousand years later to delight the eyes of millions. Shall we blame the stealer of that vase for his invasion of the property rights of his master? On the contrary, say I. I am not so particular. My right upon this earth is nothing more than my might assisted by the might of my ancestors in invading other animals, and is justified by its success.

Whether my principles are broad enough; whether there are broader principles of action yet unknown to me that would enable the sensible to check the ravages of the insensible, without resting their action on might,—is not of supreme importance. All actions are ultimately backed by might; and no one can say that, at any given era, survival or equal freedom is the right of any nation or individual. "When love pulses and whines, the doctrine of hate shall be

preached," said Emerson, the Great; and his words are volumes. The present generation has to consider the present; and, if they are appreciative enough to prevent the irremediable despoliation of important relics of past generations, or of nature's productions (the Yellowstone Park, for instance), their success will justify their actions, whether they have acted with principle or without principle. They have at least been backed by *reason*. Their pains and pleasures are *reasons* for their actions as weighty as any possible counter reasons.

I do not stickle to have my small notches and susceptibilities considered by the whole human race, for I see that it is a matter of strength and numbers that decides the total and kinds of primary interests which people respect in any country, in any age. What constitutes a nuisance, an aggression, a discord,—in a word, *what gives pain*,—varies with the people. And while the policy of antagonizing aggressions, and principle of equal liberty, may be legitimately held and practised by many races holding diverse views as to what acts are aggressive, and the order of heinousness in which the aggressive acts are tabulated, there seems to be no finale to our wrangling—and that is good, or at least not bad.

Many people like fighting. Russian peasant women are said to like being whipped by their husbands; and the husbands would surely be aggressing if they did not whip away according to the marriage contract!

Appreciating the blessings of living under a government of mixed principles, or devoid of any principle, as the lesser evil than living under the government of principles too narrow to concern itself with the protection requirements of any but those with "a lack of sympathy,"

I remain, yours hilariously,

JOHN BADCOCK, JR.

ST. BRELADE'S, LEYTON, ENGLAND, NOVEMBER 8, 1895.

A Necessity of Life.

[Emile Bergerat in Le Journal.]

To Emile Goudeau.

"Really, you see, Goudeau, it is decidedly better to be one."

"One what?"

"Why, a deputy."

"A millionaire too,—that goes without saying, and I quite agree. But the million is more stupid than the mandate, and I suspect it is less amusing. However, I may be mistaken. Say on."

"There are other reasons. Here is one, which seems to me good enough. An average Frenchman, like you and me, with two arms and two legs, can live without the million, and live in true French fashion, looking at all the columns. You go, you come, you idle or you toil, and the hour when you light your pipe (your day being over) is that when Rothschild is not your cousin. . . . Fancy a million heaped up on your table, in honest two-franc pieces; there it is, yours? In what does it distinguish you from the innumerable victims of misery who are not even billionaires and consequently compose the *vulgum pecus* of our Transvaalian democracies. Alas! Goudeau, think of those poor millionaires to whom one throws a hundred thousand francs on the corner of a bridge to help them out of their difficulty and retard, by one day at least, their suicide! The million,—why, it is less than bread; it is the contemptible dish of the day (*plat du jour*); it is the obscure routine of the most colorless taxpayer; it is the dowry of little Mademoiselle Durand marrying little Monsieur Dupont; it is the proper allowance, the day's ration in a besieged city; it is a subvention for the Odéon, it is nothing at all, even in honest two-franc pieces. Well, in a society in which the million does not count, does not represent, and does not feed its man, there is nothing left for an intelligent fellow (I tell you what I think) but to take his courage in his two hands and resign himself to be"—

"What?"

"A deputy. I am your elder, and so you must believe me. My generation, which precedes yours a little, was even more stupid, if that is possible. You others, to be sure, have failed, so far, to see that in a democracy like ours, with a passion for levelling, one is nobody if he is not what it is necessary to be,—that which I have just specified. But we were blinder still; we denied the Deputyship! We were foolish

enough to think that it was allowable to be somebody in something, without participating in public matters, and without plunging at least one paw into the mire of universal suffrage. You are canaries. We were geese. Know this: in a republic one has been nothing, nothing at all, if he has not been"—

"What?"

"A deputy. Mark what I say, and it is serious. You may be, you have been, or you may become a cabinet minister and remain unnoticed. The glory of the cabinet minister is enveloped in mist."

"You may be a member of the Academy without any one knowing it. The immortality sold there does not cross the Seine."

"You may endow the world and your country with a sublime invention, with a prodigious discovery, with an unprecedented masterpiece of art, or even with an epic poem, and yet not emerge from the gloomy shadow to which democracy consigns such services. Neither science or genius can any longer astonish this people; they are surfeited with them."

"You may found a religion, even successfully, without entering into the history of France."

"You may strangle your father and your mother, and the encyclopedia makers will not turn to look at you."

"And you may do still other things."

"But you cannot be a deputy without becoming on the spot illustrious, popular, historic, documentary, and European. Then you are, and you exist, but only then, for so it is. There you are, the Man-Power, to use the language of Victor Hugo, who was only a senator, alas! being a prophet in his own country and therefore in something lacking."

"Oh, deputy! Oh, legislative and representative man! Oh, disindividualized individual and living synthesis of the mass! Oh, son, father, and holy ghost of revealed legality! Oh, my brother, oh, my friend, open your arms, Goudeau, be proud and happy, Marianne is yours!"

"It is a great mistake not to be"—

"What?"

"A deputy. The case of Victor Hugo, who was only a senator, would have opened our eyes, if he had not been sheer imbeciles, like all the scalds. Victor Hugo began to be really known, 'outside of his special circle,' as the severe critics say, only on the day when he chucked the political wench under the chin. This slut, highly flattered, having named him her dear and first senator, the *Bourgeoisie*, till then more than recalcitrant, granted him the benefit of this selection, and the People learned that it had a poet. A work consecrated by three hundred thousand votes is a work better than consecrated, it is voted; thus it discounts the largest circulations. It is impossible to say to what fabulous figure the sale of the Master's heaviest works would by this time have risen, had he been a deputy. As it is, whatever they may say, they command only a senator's sale."

"Goudeau, my dear Goudeau, profit by this bitter lesson and this unimpeachable example. Let us be deputies, since it is a necessity. Let us breast no longer the democratic current. Let us accept life as they live it. Let us enter by way of the republic into paradise, where it assembles its *élite*. Let them lead us into its Tour de Nesle!"

"Victor Hugo dared only to be a senator. Some one had to begin. Let us dare to be representatives of the people! Time flies. Bring me a mandate, two mandates, twenty mandates, I swallow them all. If you knew, Goudeau, how I have reflected!"

"I was altogether too hasty at the last election, when they offered me a chance to symbolize the arrondissement of the Ternes in parliament; for, astounding as it is, they did really offer it to me, my dear fellow. I have just re-read my letter of declination. It is the letter of a fool. From that moment the theatrical managers have carried their heads high. Symbol and Rampart of the Ternes, I could have crushed them beneath my iron heel. Profit by my folly; accept, make speeches, and be elected. The whole secret lies there, and nowhere else."

"It is not thoughtlessly that the most sagacious minds in the modern movement, such as our comrade Maurice Barrès, the king of the young, have opened the way for us and shown us the light. His generation is the good one. It understands. Here is a fact that greatly impresses me. A passionate champion of individualism and the leader of the school, Maurice

Barrès is the first of us who has wished to represent the crowd. *Turba rail ou ruant.* His individuality incarnates itself now at Nancy, now at Neuilly-sur-Seine, and never has the necessity of being a deputy been demonstrated by a more violent contrast between the ideas of a man and his acts. It is, then, an urgent matter. It appears, moreover, that M. Emile Zola, and our Paul Bourget too, to say nothing of Ferdinand Brunetière, are surrendering. In the next campaign we shall see their posters. They will proclaim their beliefs on the walls.

"Forward, Goudeau, forward! Let us be deputies, in order to have been somebody in something, and that on our monuments may be graven the fitting inscription: 'Stranger, salute the dead. He was a deputy! He lived!'"

A Moral Murderer.

[George E. Macdonald in the Truth Seeker.]

The sneaking assassin Hannigan has been acquitted by a jury of his peers. He had a sister who associated with a man named Mann, and offered her unborn child as a sacrifice to the moral Jehovah. Before she could recover her health, Hannigan attempted to shoot Mann at her bedside, frightening her so that she died. A few weeks later he assassinated Mann in the street. Throughout the trial for murder he conducted himself as a craven. He allowed the plea of insanity to be entered in his behalf, and the jury acquitted him on that ground, the verdict at once restoring him to "reason." While he was on trial, his old father died, the murderer's third victim. At the funeral, which Hannigan was permitted to attend, he was greeted with cheers which shows either that the persons cheering did not believe him to be insane, or that they had no more sense than to applaud the bloody acts of a lunatic. Whichever is the case, no comment is necessary on that point.

In Oneida county, this State, four young men are in jail for wrecking a passenger train and causing the loss of two human lives. Their act is said to have been inspired by the career of Jesse James, the train robber. Hannigan's acts were inspired by Christian morality. The difference between the two inspirations, so far as results are concerned, is not in any degree prejudicial to the ethical system of Mr. James.

SLAVES TO DUTY.

By John Badcock, Jr.

A unique addition to the pamphlet literature of Anarchism, in that it assails the morality superstition as the foundation of the various schemes for the exploitation of mankind. Max Stirner himself does not expound the doctrine of Egoism in bolder fashion. 50 pages.

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SO THE RAILWAY KINGS ITCH FOR AN EMPIRE, DO THEY? By a "Red-Hot Striker," of Scranton, Pa. A reply to an article by William M. Groves in the *International Review*. Price, 10 cents; per hundred, \$4.00.

BOMBS: The Poetry and Philosophy of Anarchy. By William A. Whittell. 187 pages. Price, cloth, 75 cents; paper, 50 cents.

ANARCHISTS' MARCH. Tune: Bjornborgarnes Marsch (Finnish War Song). Words by J. Wm. Lloyd. Price, 10 cents.

CAPTAIN ROLAND'S PURSE: How It is Filled and How Emptied. By John Ruskin. The first of a projected series of Labor Tracts. Supplied at 37 cents per hundred.

Every Advertiser knows of "Gillam," the famous "twenty-thousand-dollar" advertising writer of Wanamaker's, Philadelphia, for many years, and now of Hilton, Hughes & Co., New York, where his ads. so crowd the thirteen acres of floor space that it sometimes looks as if the public would push the walls out. I asked him what he thought about the little magazine for advertisers called **PRINTERS' INK**. Here's what he says:

Hilton, Hughes & Co.
SUCCESSORS TO A. STEWART & CO.
NEW YORK.
LONDON. PARIS. CLEVELAND.



New York, December 6, 1896.

Mr. Wolstan Dixey,
86 World Building, City.

Dear Sir:— I like **Printers' Ink** because no one need fear a mental missile to write for it.

I like it because bright men, thinking men, successful men meet in its pages. Half an hour a week in the company of such people would help to put a keener edge on the sharpest business man.

I like **Printers' Ink** because it is so far out of the mass to censor. Each issue comes to me like the bursting of a friendly bomb. I've no idea which way the pieces will fly but I know the air will be full of them and with a business thought or theory tied to every fragment.

Such a publication well circulated must make a wide and deep mark. It has certainly had a great influence in shaping (and I believe in improving) the advertising of this country.

I have always found it an inspiration.

Very truly yours,

M. M. Gillam

All the advertisements of Marshall, Field & Co., of Chicago, are written by Mr. Chas. F. Jones. The yearly sales of the firms he represents amount to a hundred million dollars, and no money is spent in placing his ads. than on those of any other writer in America. He says in a recent letter:

"If my work is as good as some kind critics would lead the public to believe, it is largely due to **PRINTERS' INK**, as I have learned the greater portion of what I know about advertising, from reading its pages. Have I not, therefore, sufficient reason to believe that the careful study of **PRINTERS' INK** is a good thing?"

—CHAS. F. JONES.

The wealthy Maine publisher of "Allen's Lists," who made a great fortune by advertising said:

"I would pay one thousand dollars a year for **PRINTERS' INK** if it could not be secured for less, simply because I believe it to be worth more than that sum to me in my business."

E. C. ALLEN.

The man who made "H.-O." famous in one season, and who now manages the "Scott's Emulsion" advertising, almost the biggest in the world, lets his money talk as follows:

SCOTT & BOWNE, MANUFACTURING CHEMISTS.
New York, U. S. A.; Belleville, Canada. Scott & Bowne, Ltd., London, England; Paris, France; Barcelona, Spain; Milan, Italy; Oporto, Portugal.

New York, Oct. 15, 1895.

Publisher "Printers' Ink," 10 Spruce St., N. Y. City.
Dear Sir:—Enclosed please find cheque for Ten Dollars for which have Printer's Ink sent to the printer, care of Scott & Bowne, marked personal, for the next five years.

Yours, very truly,

Alfred E. Rose

Successful advertising simply means skillful advertising, and the only way to learn it is to study it, as others have. You can get **PRINTERS' INK** now for \$2 a year if you send in your subscription to 10 Spruce St., New York, before Jan. 1st. That day the price will be raised to \$5 a year and it ought to be. I don't see how a man who does any advertising whatever can get along without **PRINTERS' INK**. I can't.

Wolstan Dixey.

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